The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to investigate the integration process within the European Union retail banking sector by analysing deposit and lending rates to the household sector during the period 2003-2011. Secondly, to assess the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on the banking integration process, an area that is yet unexplored. An important contribution of the paper is the application of the recently developed Phillips and Sul (2007a) panel convergence methodology which has not hitherto been employed in this area. This method analyses the degree as well as the speed of convergence, identifies the presence of club formation, and measures the behaviour of each country's transition path relative to the panel average. The empirical results point to the presence of convergence in all deposit and lending rates to the household sector up to 2007. In sharp contrast, the null of convergence is rejected in all deposit and credit markets after the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. These results show that the global crisis has had a detrimental effect on the banking integration process. We find some convergence in a few sub-clusters of countries but the rate of convergence is typically slow and several countries are identified as diverging altogether. In addition, we find that the credit market, in general, is far more heterogeneous than the savings market.
1.

Introduction
As part of the wider aim for a Single Market for financial services which was launched in 1992, a single market for EU banking was viewed as pivotal by the European Commission. The aim was to facilitate the establishment of pan-European providers of financial products, generate greater consumer choice, and boost efficiency and competition, amongst others. At the time, major regulatory and institutional reforms were launched and these have been revised and reformulated over the years to keep up with an ever-changing and dynamic market. The wholesale banking sector has been widely investigated in the literature while the retail sector to a much lesser extent. The first aim of this paper is to investigate how successful the Single Market initiatives have been in creating an integrated European retail banking sector. Financial integration is understood to lead to long-run equilibrium and in this paper we assess the degree and speed of convergence towards retail banking integration. Given the importance of the household sector as a component of retail banking, it is believed that a thorough analysis of deposit, consumer credit and mortgage rates with varying maturities can paint a true picture of the integration process in European retail banking.
Moreover, given the severity of the 2007/8 global financial crisis and the ensuing Euro sovereign debt crisis, it is essential that we analyse the impact of the recent crises on European banking sector integration. Indeed as argued by Dabrowski (2010) , the global financial crisis has sprung new challenges for the Single European Market initiative and its institutional structure. Quoting the heavy exposure of European banks to toxic assets and the subsequent chaotic policy responses at EU level, Dabrowski (2010) further argues that the crisis has uncovered several systemic weaknesses amongst European banks. This view has also been reported by Fonteyne et al (2010) who argue that the financial crisis has revealed gaps in the current EU cross border arrangements on crisis management, resolution and burden-sharing within the EU. The debate now is whether the new arrangements can fully address the shortcomings that have come to light. In addition, as the authors point out, the crisis has also shown the weaknesses of linking financial stability to fiscal responsibility. Not only has the strain on national budgets been severe since the crisis but it has also prevented better cross-border coordination. This has distorted the workings of an efficient single market. Furthermore, as stated by Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) , since 2009, the global financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area whereby global banking risks have been transformed into sovereign risk due to a lack of bank liquidity and an increase in fiscal liabilities as well as due to the impact on government debt after bank bailouts. This is reflected in the credit ratings of the EU countries where a clear demarcation is noted with Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain being rated lower compared to the rest of the EU15 countries. Furthermore, as argued by Black et al (2013) , in 2011, with the escalation of the Greek crisis and the fear of contagion spreading to Spain and Italy in particular, concerns about systemic risk in European banks were mounting. In their empirical measurement of systemic risks amongst European banks, Black et al (2013) find that the banks' systemic risks were largely due to default risks and reached a peak in 2011.
Furthermore, variability in the systemic importance of banks was present with Italian and Spanish banks showing higher concerns compared to the UK banks.
Consequently, in light of the challenges faced by the Single Market due to heightened credit risks, refinancing risks and sovereign risks in the banking sector stemming from the global crisis, the second aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the global financial crisis on the integration of the European retail banking sector. We do so by firstly subdividing the sample period into 2 sub-periods; 2003-2007 and 2008-2011. Secondly, we further divide our sample for the second sub-period into two groups of countries; one comprising the countries with a lower credit rating 1 (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the second group consisting of the remaining ten EU countries. In addition, given that the UK and Sweden conduct independent monetary policy, we further test for convergence exclusively for the group of euro area countries plus Denmark 2 .
An overview of the literature, starting from the 1990s to the present, shows a mixed picture with regards to investigations on the process of European retail banking integration. Some of the earlier studies Sander (2000, 2003) , Schuler and Heinemman (2002) ), typically conduct bivariate cointegration analysis on interest rate spreads for different household lending and deposit rates. Other studies (Murinde et al, 2000 , Adam et al, 2002 and Vajanne, 2007 draw from the growth literature based on beta and sigma panel convergence tests to assess the degree and speed of convergence in the retail household sector. The remaining studies (Affinito and Farabullini, 2006 , Sorensen and Litchtenberger, 2007 , Sorensen and Guiterrez, 2006 , apply some different techniques such as the tests of coefficient equality and hierarchical cluster analysis to euro area retail banking sector.
Overall, for the 1990s period, the evidence in the literature so far paints a picture of a fragmented retail banking market. Regarding the more recent period, progress in the retail banking integration process is observed. This lends support to the argument that the launch of the euro, as well as the initiatives stemming from the Single Market and more recently, the Financial Services Action Plan, has been effective. Nonetheless, in most of the recent studies, the persistence of cross-country heterogeneity is also clearly evident. Limited institutional convergence in European banking and the importance of national characteristics, among other factors, are considered to be responsible for these results.
In the case of several of these studies, a number of short-comings have been identified.
Firstly, some of the earlier studies (see Schuler and Heinemann, 2002; Sander and Kleimeier, 2003) apply time series cointegration analysis to small samples which, as widely argued in the literature, result in a loss of power of the test. The same observation is noted for the study by Affinito and Farabullini (2006) who apply unit root tests and tests of equality on country coefficients on a sample covering 2 years only. Second, the sample periods covered in most of the studies stop in the early 2000s except for the one by Vajanne (2007) who considers a sample up to 2006. The empirical model used by Sorensen and Litchtenberger (2007) also considers data up to 2006 but it must be noted that their analysis is predominantly an investigation of the determinants of mortgage rate dispersion rather than a direct assessment of the degree of integration within retail banking. Third, none of the studies on retail banking integration uses an actual test of convergence except for the application of beta and sigma convergence tests drawn from the growth literature 3 . However, even with the beta and sigma convergence methodology, limitations have been identified. For instance, as argued by Quah (1996) , beta convergence is uninformative on the behaviour of the dispersion of the entire cross-section. He further argues that sigma convergence does not factor in the convergent or divergent behaviour of individual countries in the sample but is only concerned with how the whole cross-section behaves. Hence these convergence tests do not enable the analysis of the behaviour of each individual country series over time. Also, as argued by Islam (2003) , β-and σ-convergence are more relevant within the context of growth literature and he has uncovered problems that arise when empirical analysis of convergence are conducted using these methodologies.
We make three major contributions to the literature. Thirdly, the test does not necessitate any specific assumptions regarding the stationarity of the variables and allows for cases where individual series may be transitionally divergent. This information is obtained through the computation of each country's relative transition parameter and the depiction of its transition path which portrays the country's behaviour relative to the panel cross-section average over time.
This is very significant as it can potentially uncover situations where individual countries may be diverging even if as a whole group, convergence is detected.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 outlines the Phillips and Sul(2007a) convergence methodology. Section 3 describes the datasets used. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while section 5 concludes.
Empirical methodology
4
See an application in Sul (2007b, 2009) In this paper we take the view that integration in retail banking is a process whereby This methodology can thus be described as an asymptotic cointegration test that models long run equilibrium while allowing for individual heterogeneity which can evolve over time. In particular, this feature of the Phillips and Sul methodology makes it superior to the beta and sigma convergence test as the P&S test allows for both common and individual heterogeneity. Furthermore, the Phillips and Sul methodology is better suited for this analysis as the time varying component of this test not only reveals the speed at which retail integration is taking place, if present, (which is also indicated by the beta and sigma convergence tests) but also highlights the different extent and speed of the integration level in the group of countries through the process of club formation.
Relative transition paths
Panel data for a variable it X can normally be decomposed into two components comprising systematic components, it g , and transitory components, it a , as follows:
6 A few recent studies have used the Phillips and Sul (2007a) The main procedure in the Phillips and Sul convergence test is to calculate the timevarying loadings, it g and to do so, Phillips and Sul(2007a) reformulates equation (1) such that common and idiosyncratic components are separated as follows: 
The so-called relative transition parameter it h measures it δ in relation to the panel average at time t and therefore describes the transition path for country i relative to the panel average. Moreover, the convergence process can be graphically illustrated by plotting the transition parameter for each country over time.
However, macroeconomic variables often contain business cycle components which render the representation in (3) inappropriate. Hence, following Phillips and Sul (2007a) recommendation, the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter is used to filter out the cycle component in the interest rate data series and then work out the filtered transition coefficients it ĥ . Hodrick and Prescott (1997) demonstrate that higher frequency data require a higher value for the smoothing parameter. In this paper the value of lamda is set to 14400, as suggested in the literature 7 for monthly data.
The Log t regression
The log t regression test of convergence tests for the null hypothesis of convergence:
7 For instance, in Eviews, the default value for lamda is 14400 for monthly data. Phillips and Sul's (2007) procedure involves three steps, as listed below.
Step 1: The cross sectional variance ratio t H H 1 is calculated as follows:
Step 2: The following OLS regression is performed:
Where L(t) = log(t+1) and the fitted coefficient of log t is
, where α is the estimate of α in H 0 . The data for this regression starts at t =[rT] with some r > 0.
Based on the results of their Monte-Carlo simulations, Phillips and Sul (2007a) recommend r = 0.3.
Step 3: A one-sided t test of null 0 ≥ α using b and a standard error estimated using a 
Club convergence algorithm
Following Phillips and Sul's (2007a) argument that a strict rejection of the null of convergence may not necessarily rule out the existence of sub-group convergence within the panel, the authors have developed a club convergence algorithm to detect such units of clusters. In the scope of this paper, this methodology will bring new insight into the convergence process within the EU15 retail banking sector by revealing whether clusters of convergence are present. If present, then the relationship within the clusters based on economic or structural characteristics can be further explored. Phillips and Sul (2007a) clustering algorithm is based on repeated log t regressions and contains four main steps which are described below.
Step 1: The it X series in the panel are ordered according to the last observation, iT X .
Step is raised and the procedure is repeated.
Step 4: The log t test is run on the group of countries not selected in step 3 and if convergence is detected within this new cluster, a second club is formed. Otherwise, in the case of rejection, steps 1, 2 and 3 are repeated on the remaining countries. If no other subgroups can be detected, it can be concluded that the remaining countries diverge.
Data sets and variable definitions
Nine monthly deposit and lending interest rate data sets for the households have been Table 1 . Of noteworthy importance is the fact that the magnitude of the convergence coefficient, b , provides key information on the rate of convergence. Basically, the higher the value of b , the faster the rate of convergence.
Empirical results
Phillips and Sul (2007a) log t-test
10 No harmonised data from the ECB is available prior to January 2003. 11 The ECB Statistical Data Warehouse provides monthly harmonised data based on maturity duration for the household sector.
12
The Gauss codes for the computation of the logt test and convergence clubs are available from Sul's website, http://homes.eco.auckland.ac.nz/dsul013/.
<Insert Table 1 Eventually, in an attempt to harmonise the situation, the European Union amended the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive to increase the minimum coverage to € € 50,000
and to € € 100,000 one year later. Work on creating a more level playing field by 13 Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
harmonising the Deposit Guarantee Scheme and developing a funding model is still on-going at the European Commission level 14 . The Commission is expected to assess how a more integrated cross-border resolution and a crisis management framework are expected to be in place by 2014 (ECB, 2011 . Moreover, the system for cross border payments was largely fragmented and posed a major impediment to the integration of the consumer credit market. In 1999, the common large-value payment system, TARGET, was launched but for retail low- (Wyman, 2005) . This can be largely attributed to cultural differences and attitudes to credit within the EU. Overall, these factors may be responsible for the slow growth in group convergence, as evidenced by the log t-test.
With regards to the log t-tests for the consumer credit panels for the period 2008-2011, in contrast, the null of convergence is rejected for all the panels, including the subcategories of i) euro-area countries plus Denmark; ii) GIIPS countries and iii) non-GIIPS countries. Once more, the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis in putting a halt to the integration process is clearly evident in these findings. Moreover, given the role that credit market risks played in the build-up of the crisis, it is not surprising that the credit market has taken such a hit. In the aftermath of a banking crisis, it is common occurrence for banks to scale back on their credit activities and in the case of Europe, credit tightening has been rife during 2008 (Coeuré, 2012 . Given the heavy reliance on bank credit in Europe, this has undoubtedly worsened the situation both domestic-wise and especially across-border. Coeuré (2012) further adds that the reduction in the growth of loans to households is a result of both a decline in the supply of loans to funding shortages but also due to a reduction in demand for credit and that the situation varies among the European countries, highlighting an increase in cross-country heterogeneity. Given the escalation of the Euro sovereign debt crisis in 2012, it is very likely that this heterogeneity will widen and further impair the integration process.
As for the 4 panels of mortgage rates with varying maturities for the period 2003- (Pilbeam, 2010) . Within the context of European mortgage interest rates, Bondt et al (2005) show that long term retail bank interest rates adjust not only to short-term interest rates but also to long term market interest rates. Their analysis is based on an error correction model that looks at long term mortgage rates in ten 16 EU countries. The authors argue that in the presence of uncertainty with regards to future monetary policy changes, banks adjust their long-term retail interest rates in line with a target long-term money market rate which would better incorporate any expected future changes. Their argument also proposes that interest rate exposure due to a mismatch in maturities for assets and liabilities will thus be limited.
The second theoretical explanation for the limited convergence in long-term mortgage rates is the liquidity preference theory whereby longer term interest rates not only reflect market expectations but also include a risk or liquidity premium to factor in the higher level of risk for the lender. Martin-Oliver et al (2007) investigate the retail banking rate differences among Spanish banks for the period 1989 to 2003 using the relative and absolute law of one price and find that credit risk premium which is part of the marginal costs of loans is an important explanatory factor for dispersion among loan rates for various banks. Furthermore, based on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, the study finds that loan maturity is an important determinant of interest rate variability. Overall, based on their findings, the authors extrapolate that differences in credit risk policies would have a significant bearing on European retail banking integration. A similar conclusion was also reported in the ECB (2006) 
Club clustering test and transition paths
Having established the presence of convergence in all of the deposit, consumer credit and mortgage up to 2007 and not beyond, the next step in the analysis is the application of the Phillips and Sul (2007) clustering algorithm test which would identify countries that are converging within different clusters and highlight diverging behaviour. The strength of this test is that even if the whole panel of 15 countries do not converge as a block, sub-group convergence, if present, may still be detected.
Hence, retail banking integration should not be ruled out just on the basis of the log ttest but must be analysed together with the club clustering test results. The test statistics are reported in Table 2 , and discussed below together with the third component of the test which is the calculation of each country's filtered relation transition coefficient, . This transition coefficient illustrates the path taken by each country's filtered series vis-à-vis the panel average over the time period investigated.
Consequently, this procedure provides additional information on the convergence process in European retail banking.
<Insert Table 2 here> 4.2.1.
Short term deposit rates: 2003-2007
The sub-club convergence tests reveal the presence of only one cluster, grouping all <Insert Figure 1 here> 
Short term deposit rates: 2008-2011
As seen in Section 4.1, the log t-test for group convergence is rejected for the short term deposit rates for this period. countries. There is, once more, consistency with regards to the groupings of the countries into the sub-clubs. Overall these results are consistent with the log t-test which portrays a fragmented deposit market following the financial crisis. The results also imply that the club formation is not affected by the variability in credit risks.
Looking at the transition paths displayed in Figure 2 for all the countries, it can be observed that the paths for the countries belonging to the first cluster in each subcategory have a similar trajectory, well away from the cross-section average, in particular Greece. The same can be observed for the countries in the second cluster and the divergent countries.
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
Deposit rates (1-2 years' maturity): 2003-2007
The clustering test results for the deposit rates with medium-term maturities for the 15 EU countries shows a similar convergence process as for the deposit rates with shorter-term maturities. Once again, all 15 EU countries belong to just one sub-club pointing out to retail banking integration in this market during this period. However, the speed of convergence is slower for this panel set ( b =1.305). This fairly pronounced degree of convergence is also illustrated in the behaviour of the panel of countries' transition paths (Figure 3 ). It can be observed that, at the start of the period, the transition paths for UK and Sweden diverge from the cross-section average of one but slowly move towards the average around 2005. This was evident too for the deposit rates with shorter maturities and the same reasons, as discussed in Section 4.2.1, can be cited as explanations for such behaviour.
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
Deposit rates (1-2 years' maturity): 2008-2011
On the other hand, the clustering results for the medium deposit rates after the crisis show opposite results with 13 of the countries rejecting the null of convergence and only two countries (Denmark and Luxembourg) showing club convergence.
Interestingly, if we exclude the GIIPS countries from the panel, we find club convergence, albeit at a slow place ( b = 0.14) in the first group of countries while Denmark and Luxembourg once more cluster together. So overall, the results overwhelmingly point to an abrupt halt in the integration process in the deposit market especially if the GIIPS countries are included, as observed in Section 4.1. The transition paths, on their part (see Figure 4) show very heterogeneous behaviour from the majority of the countries and underpin the discussion in Section 4.1.
<Insert Figure 4 here> 
Deposit rates (>2years' maturity): 2003-2007
With regards to the household deposit rates with over 2 years' maturity, once more, akin to the other 2 deposit sets for the 2003-2007 period, just 1 sub-cluster is identified, grouping all 14 countries in the sample. However, a much slower speed of convergence is noted, compared to the deposit rates with shorter maturities for the same period ( b =0.82). These results point to a mixed picture on the convergence process for this dataset. This observation is also highlighted in the illustration of each country's transition path for this panel (see Figure 5 ). It is clearly visible that the transition paths for the 14 EU countries do not show a common front.
<Insert Figure 5 here> Therefore, the major observation here is that the convergence process for that period seems definitely slower or more diverse when deposit rates with longer maturities are tested as opposed to deposit rates with shorter maturities. The explanation for the variation in the convergence process can be drawn from a theoretical perspective. As widely discussed, long-term interest rates reflect financial market expectations of future inflation, economic developments and interest rates set by the central banks.
Hence, by inference, long-term interest rates are determined by economic conditions at country-level and as such wide disparities are bound to exist within the panel of 15 EU countries. This would, in turn, translate into weaker integration with the retail banking sector. Moreover, as discussed in various interest pass-through literature,
given the nature of the retail banking sector where regulatory and institutional barriers are rife, retail banking rates tend to adjust more slowly to competitive market rates. Of particular interest is the study by Sorensen and Werner (2006) who apply the Pedroni cointegration test to model a relationship between euro-area saving deposit rates and market rates. They find that the adjustments for the deposit rates are so sluggish that no long-run relationship with the market rates can be detected. The authors also attribute these results to differences in national regulations such as ceilings on rates and tax exemptions.
Another relevant study is the one by Gropp et al (2007) who investigate the adjustment process of retail euro area deposit spreads relative to the national interbank deposit rates and find that bank spreads for deposit rates with varying maturities (including long-term) adjust sluggishly to market rates. Importantly, the authors also reveal that control variables such as bank soundness, credit risk and interest rate risk have a significant influence on the speed of pass-through. Moreover, they also find that competition among banks triggers a faster pass-through. Therefore, based on these findings and the Phillips and Sul (2007) test results as discussed above, another notable inference that can be drawn here is that the lesser the degree of competition, the lesser the resulting degree of retail banking integration.
Deposit rates (>2years' maturity): 2008-2011
The clustering results for the longer term deposit rates after the crisis reveal that the slower rate of convergence noted for the earlier period has now turned to no convergence with 11 of the 14 countries rejecting the null of convergence. Austria, What is evident with this sample is that the duration of maturity seems to be inversely related to convergence. This is further illustrated by the transition paths ( Figure 9) which are very heterogeneous, especially at the start of the period.
<Insert Figure 9 here> 
Consumer credit rates (1-5 years' maturity): 2008-2011
The clustering results for the consumer credit rates with longer-term maturity for the Overall, for the consumer credit panels, it can be observed that the countries move in and out of different clusters depending on which data set is tested, thus highlighting inconsistent behaviour. This haphazard clustering of the 15 EU countries and the diversity observed in the transition paths for the countries could be interpreted as follows. Firstly, these results could be reflecting the inherent national characteristics of retail banking such as varying market structures, different credit instruments, and legal and regulatory framework, amongst others. Secondly, the occurrence of the financial crisis has compounded the first factor and has further fragmented the consumer credit market along national boundaries.
Mortgage rates (1 year maturity): 2003-2007
For the short-term mortgage rates, all the EU countries in the panel form one single In the case of Greece, one main aspect that sets the Greek mortgage market apart from the rest is the fact that the country has generally one of the lowest residential mortgage-debt to GDP ratio among the EU 15 countries (EMF, 2009). Additionally, compared to the other European countries, repayments periods tend to be shorter and a greater proportion of short-term fixed rate mortgages are available as opposed to variable rate mortgages (Miles, 2003) . As for Portugal, according to Standard and Poor's (2012) , in the early 2000s, the mortgage market went through a significant reduction in growth and attributed this to a rise in interest rates and much stricter regulation. This could explain the behaviour shown by the country's transition path at the start of the period.
<Insert Figure 13 here> 
Mortgage rates (1-5 years' maturity): 2008-2011
Unsurprisingly, given the origins of the financial crisis, the impact on the European mortgage market has been severe. The clustering tests show that no club formation is present; with all the EU15 countries either displaying a negative rate of convergence ( b =-0.229) or being labelled as divergent (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg).
These results are reproduced fairly consistently even if i) Sweden and the UK and ii)
GIIPS countries are excluded. This highlights the impact of the crisis on the mortgage market across all countries irrespective of the differences in monetary independence or the level credit risks. This fact is also dramatically depicted in Figure 14 where it can clearly be seen how the paths suddenly become increasingly divergent beyond 2008.
<Insert Figure 14 here> 
Mortgage rates (5-10 years' maturity): 2003-2007
The clustering algorithm reveals only one sub-club grouping 14 of the 15 EU countries for the medium-term mortgage rates for the 2003-2007 period. Greece is the only divergent country. The speed of convergence for the cluster ( b =0.550) is also similar to those of the 1yr and 1-5 years mortgage panels for the same period. The transition paths, as illustrated in Figure 15 , for the mortgage rates with medium term maturities show general similarities between the countries in the sample, with some concentration visible around the cross-section average. Interestingly, it is also apparent that the behaviour of the transition coefficients for Spain, Greece and
Portugal take different paths from the rest of the group. The reasons cited above in Section 4.2.13 provide an interpretation for Portugal's and Greece's paths. As for Spain, a study by Sorensen and Werner (2006) , which looks at the interest rate passthrough for various mortgage rates for the euro-area countries, makes the observation that the mortgage rates for Spain tend to adjust more slowly than other countries. Note: a) The Phillips and Sul (2007a) club clustering log t-test were run in OxEdit using the Gauss code programmed by Sul (2007) . b) * Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level. c) The results are generated using Ox version 4.00 (see Doornik, 2006) .
